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Abstract 
 
 
As is well known, the uncovered interest rate parity fails in the short run but usually holds in the 
long run.  This paper analyses the long and short run interest rate parity of 10 mayor OECD 
currencies and finds that there is a long run failure of the uncovered interest rate parity condition for 
the Swiss Franc. After correcting for exchange rate changes, mean returns on Swiss assets have 
been significantly lower than in other currencies, an anomaly not found in any other major 
currency.  The long run return differential has been stable over the last 20 years, transitory structural 
breaks are only found in times of currency turmoil. We suggest that the return anomaly may be due 
to an insurance premium against very rare catastrophic events, such as a major war.  Supporting 
evidence for this hypothesis comes from two empirical findings: First, we show that the return 
differential is negatively affected by large unexpected geo-political events. Second we examine 
historical data on interest rates differentials and show that the abnormally low level of Swiss returns 
arises after the first world war only. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A well known puzzle of foreign exchange markets is the anomalous response of exchange 
rates to interest rate differentials.  The literature that has documented this short run failure of the 
uncovered interest rate parity typically finds that an increase in the domestic interest of one percent 
is followed by  an appreciation--rather than a depreciation--of the domestic currency at the annual 
rate of almost one percent or even more1. Thus the naive strategy of investing in the currency 
offering a higher interest rate promises abnormally excess returns. However, this anomaly seems to 
exist only in the short run. The unconditional mean of the appreciation rate of the US Dollar against 
major currencies does not seem to be statistically different from that of the interest rate differential 
(Hodrick, 2000). Therefore we can conclude that the failure of UIP in the short run (forward 
premium puzzle) offers only short run return opportunities which are subject to a considerable risk 
given the high volatility of exchange rates2
In this paper we show that this conclusion, which is valid for most pairs of major 
currencies, does not hold for the Swiss Franc. First, we document the anomaly that Swiss Franc 
mean returns are statistically significantly lower than the exchange rate change corrected return on 
all other major currencies.  Second, we show that the return differential has been stable and it has 
not diminished over time. Next we show that  the Swiss Franc is by no means special with regard to 
the short run failure of the uncovered interest rate parity (forward premium puzzle). Therefore, we 
identify a puzzle which present only in Swiss Franc assets and represents a failure of UIP on 
average over more than 20 years. 3
A popular explanation for low returns on Swiss Franc assets is related to national or 
regulatory features of Switzerland (such as the Swiss banking secrecy). However, this explanation 
is not convincing since we find the return anomaly in Euromarket deposits, which are outside Swiss 
legislation.  
                                                     
1 Froot (1990) finds that the average coefficient of 75 studies of the forward discount bias is –0.88. More 
recent surveys often present coefficient estimates below for major currencies, Engle (1996), Hodrick (2000). 
2 This is the conclusion drawn by Cochrane (1999) in his survey on „New Facts in Finance“. 
3 Furthermore, an analysis of sources of real return differentials (after correcting for exchange rate changes) 
shows that they alos can be attributed mostly to the failure of uncovered interest rate parity, rather than a 
failure of relative purchasing power parity. See Kugler and Weder (2004).  
 2
 We offer an alternative explanation based on a peso problem: Investors may be accepting 
somewhat lower returns in the expectation that the Swiss Franc would appreciate in the event of a 
large scale catastrophe. Since such events are rare and have not been observed in the past 20 years it 
is difficult to test the hypothesis for this period.  
Nevertheless we find support for this hypothesis from two empirical findings: first, we 
show that the return differential is negatively affected in the short run by large unexpected geo-
political events, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, or the sudden death of Soviet leaders. Second 
we present historical evidence on interest rates differentials during the pre-war and inter-war period. 
These show that the abnormally low level of Swiss returns arises after the first world war only..4   
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the methodology and the data. 
Section 3 presents the results and section 4  concludes. 
 
2. Methodology  and Data 
For each country we have three variables of interest: The interest rate (i), the change in the log of 
the nominal exchange rate defined as the home currency price of the foreign currency, (∆s) and the 
CPI Inflation rate (π). Foreign variables are denoted by *.   
First of all we will consider the mean of the differential of the one month nominal returns in the 
foreign and home currency corrected for exchange rate changes: 
 
   1,
*
1,, −− −∆+= ttititi isid
 
According to a weak (long run) form of UIP the (unconditional) mean value of this variable 
should be zero.  
                                                     
4 Our solution to the puzzle is akin to the one Jorion and Goetzmann (1999), offer for the equity premium 
puzzle. They showed that the equity price puzzle also disappears for countries that suffered catastrophic 
events, in particular the interruption of the stock exchange during the wars. Furthermore, this explanation for 
low retunrs is also compatible with a portfolio approach, which stresses the covariance of returns. In Kugler 
and Weder (2004) we show that some Swiss franc assets have a very low or even negative correlation with 
the returns of other risky assets. 
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Next we take into account the dynamics of the variables of interest. First we consider an 
univariate model: We study a system of AR(1) equations for all nine rate of return differentials.  
 
tittitiiittiti eisiisi ,21,
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This allows us to take into account the weak autocorrelation of the return differential of interest 
and to test jointly the hypotheses concerning the intercepts of these regressions which determines 
the mean rate of return differentials. Moreover we test the structural stability of these equations 
estimated for the nominal return differentials. To this end we apply the recently developed multiple 
break test with unknown break dates published by Bai and Perron (1998). This approach 
sequentially determines the break point according to the maximal F-statistic for all possible break 
points. This means that first the sample is split in two parts by this criterion. Then the same 
approach is applied to the two subsamples and so on. We consider a maximum of five break points 
and a minimum distance of four months between two breaks. The test is used in two variants: First 
stability with respect only to the intercept term is considered. Second intercept and slope coefficient 
are tested jointly.  
In a next step we test for the equality of the unconditional mean of the log exchange rate 
change and the interest rate differential in a bivariate VAR(1) framework. This approach should 
give a more powerful test of the hypothesis of interest as it accounts for the dynamic 
interrelationship of the two variables. Denoting the white noise error terms of the (stable) VAR(1) 
system by ε we can write our model as follows: 
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Given this model we can easily derive the unconditional means of the two variables as 
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Therefore, the equality of the two means can be tested as the following cross equation restriction for 
our VAR(1) model 
121211212122 )1()1( cacacaca +−=+−
 
This restriction is tested using a likelihood ratio test under the assumption of normally distributed 
error terms. 
In a next step we examine the well known failure of UIP in the short run (forward premium 
puzzle) with our data set. Of course this could be done by testing the corresponding restrictions on 
the coefficients of our first VAR(1) equation.5 As this puzzle is usually documented in a more 
restricted simple regression framework, namely by regressing the log exchange rate change on the 
lagged interest rate differential and by showing that the slope coefficient estimate is negative and 
statistically different from one, we will follow this practice. However, it should be mentioned that 
the test results obtained in the VAR framework are qualitatively equal to those provided by the 
simple regression method. 
For the floating rate period, we check our interpretation of  the persistently negative excess 
return of fixed income Swiss Franc asset as an insurance against catastrophic risks by analyzing the 
reaction of its conditional mean to variables measuring worldwide risk and  geo-political 
uncertainty.6  The basic idea is that the appreciation of the Swiss Franc decreases exchange rate 
corrected foreign currency returns in reaction to increased worldwide uncertainty with respect to 
economic and, in particular, political developments. World-wide risk is represented by economic 
factors as the (log) changes in the index of industrial production in industrialized countries (%IPI) 
                                                     
5 . 1,0,0 12111 === aac
6 We thank Mathias Hoffmann for suggesting this analysis. 
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and the price of oil (%POIL) as well as changes in world bond (%GSCIW), stock (MSCIW) and 
commodity market return (CGBIW) indexes.  In addition, we included four dummy variables for 
representing unexpected events which are deemed to have increase the worldwide political 
uncertainty, namely the death of the Sowjet leader Cherneko (March 11, 1985), the Tschernobyl 
nuclear accident (April 28, 1986), the fall of the Berlin wall (November 9, 1989) and the invasion of 
Kuwait (August 2, 1990). These events where selected because of their clearly exogenous nature 
and because they were large and unexpected surprises with a significant geo-plolitical impact.   The 
statistical significance of theses variables on return differentials is then tested in the framework of a 
multiple regression model for the return differentials of Siwss franc and foreign currency money 
market investment using data for the period 1985 to 1998 for which  all the economic factors 
including the world bond index were available.   
 
Data:  
Interest rates are 1 month Euro deposits for 10 currencies, namely Belgian Franc (BEF), 
Canadian Dollar (CAD), Deutschmark (DEM), French Franc (FFR), Italian Lira (ITL), Japanese 
Yen (JAP), Dutch Guilder (NLG), Pound (UKP),  Dollar (USD) and Swiss Franc (SFR).  The data 
source is Datastream for the Euro interest rates, for exchange rates, for world bond (GSCI), stock 
(MSCI) and commodity return (CGBI) indexes.  Data on  CPI inflation, industrial production in 
industrialized countries and on oil prices was obtained from IFS. The exchange rate are Dollar rates 
or cross rates, respectively. 
We use two data sets. First, we use monthly data set from 1980-98. This period was selected as 
international capital movements were completely liberalized in the countries at the end of the 
seventies. 7 The second data set contains yearly data on short term interest rates (3 months) from 
1880-1970 for seven major countries.8 We consider evidence from the period is the classical gold 
standard which is usually dated from 1880 until the first Word war in 1914, from the inter-war 
period with the restored gold standard (lasted between 1923/26 and 1931/36, depending on the 
country) and from the Bretton Woods period.   
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3.  Results  
 
 Table 1 reports the mean values of all 45 return differentials of our ten currencies and the 
standard errors, where the row indicates the home country. This table shows an interesting pattern: 
The Swiss Franc is the only currency  for which consistently a positive nominal return differential is 
reported, i.e. the foreign investment has a higher mean return. This difference is largest with respect 
to the Non-European currencies and the Lira and lowest with respect to the DM and the Guilder. 
For all other currencies we observe changing signs. Moreover, we should note that the standard 
errors are rather large reflecting the high month to month exchange rate variability.     
 
Table1: Rate of Return Differentials (after exchange rate adjustment), Percent p.a. 
Mean 1980-1998 and Standard Errors in Parenthesis 
 
 CAD 
 
DEM FFR ITL JYN NLG UKP USD SFR 
BEF 0.18 
(2.71) 
-0.95 
(0.56) 
0.53 
(0.69) 
1.76 
(1.42) 
1.22 
(2.49) 
-0.88 
(0.55) 
1.13 
(2.08) 
0.48 
(2.68) 
1.88 
(1.22) 
CAD  -1.23 
(2.74) 
0.35 
(2.67 
1.58 
(2.56) 
1.04 
(2.99) 
-1.06 
(2.76) 
0.95 
(2.63) 
0.30 
(1.09) 
2.06 
(3.01) 
DEM   1.58 
(0.60) 
2.81 
(1.37) 
2.27 
(2.49) 
0.71 
(0.37) 
2.18 
(2.09) 
1.53 
(2.68) 
0.83 
(1.09) 
FFR    1.23 
(1.39) 
0.69 
(2.47) 
-1.41 
(0.59) 
0.60 
(2.06) 
-0.05 
(2.61) 
2.41 
(1.21) 
ITL     -0.54 
(2.72) 
-2.64 
(1.38) 
-0.63 
(2.07) 
-1.28 
(2.56) 
3.64 
(1.85) 
JYN      -2.10 
(2.48) 
-0.09 
(2.28) 
-0.74 
(2.87) 
3.10 
(2.49) 
NLG       2.01 
(2.02) 
1.36 
(2.67) 
1.00 
(1.08) 
UKP        -0.65 
(2.63) 
3.01 
(2.27) 
USD         2.36 
(2.93) 
 
 
Now let us focus our analysis on the difference between the nine other currencies and the 
Swiss Franc rate of returns. Table 2 shows the results of a system of AR(1) equations for all nine 
rate of return differentials. This allows us to take into account the weak autocorrelation of the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
8  We thank Michael Bordo for providing this data set.  
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variables of interest and to test jointly hypotheses concerning the intercepts of these regressions 
which determines the mean rate of return differentials.  
 
Table2:  Results from AR(1) Models for Nominal Return Differentials, 
Swiss Franc vis-à-vis 9 Currencies, Monthly Data 1980-98, 
 
 
 
OLS-Estimates, Standard Errors in Parentheses 
 
Currency             γ δ 
BEF 2.08 
(1.26) 
0.059 
(0.063) 
CAD 2.56 
(3.03) 
0.021 
(0.063) 
DEM 1.39 
(1.14) 
0.13 
(0.063) 
FFR 2.72 
(1.25) 
0.12 
(0.062) 
ITL 4.18 
(1.85) 
0.031 
0.064) 
JAP 1.67 
(2.43) 
0.091 
(0.063) 
NLG 1.64 
(1.13) 
0.13 
(0.063) 
UKP 3.77 
(2.27) 
0.14 
(0.063) 
USD 2.81 
(2.98) 
0.047 
(0.064) 
 
For most of these intercept terms the hypothesis that they are zero cannot be rejected 
individually. However, the Wald Test that all intercept terms are jointly zero can be clearly rejected 
at  the 5 percent significance levels. The test statistic, which is χ square distributed with nine 
degrees of freedom under the null, take the value 20.86 with a marginal significance level of 0.013. 
Moreover, the hypothesis that all intercept terms are the same cannot be rejected. The 
corresponding Wald test statistics is 2.44 and the marginal significance level for the χ-square 
distribution with 8 degrees of freedom is 0.964. Thus, there is no statistically significant difference 
of the mean nominal return differential of all nine currencies and the Swiss Franc. The same result 
tittitiiittiti eisiisi ,21,
*
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applies to the positive AR(1) coefficients, which were jointly statistically significantly different 
from zero, but there is no statistically significant difference among these coefficients.  
 
Table 3 presents Bai and Perron´s (1998) test of the structural stability of these equations 
estimated for the nominal return differentials.  
 
Table 3: Results of the Sequential Bai-Perron Test for Multiple Structural Changes AR(1) 
Models for Nominal Return Differentials, Swiss Franc vis-à-vis 9 Currencies, Monthly Data 
1980-98 
 
 
Currency Break in intercept  Break in intercept and slope  
 Break Point F-statistic Break point F-statistic 
BEF 82:3 6.70 82:2 7.31 
 89:12 3.93 81:9 7.17 
 81:2 2.40 98:6 2.71 
CAD 85:2 7.43 85:2 7.02 
 86:2 6.37 86:8 8.97 
 87:12 2.25 84:3 3.79 
DEM 82:2 2.97 83:1 3.69 
 83:3 4.58 81:9 4.65 
 93:2 0.86 98:7 3.46 
FFR 81:12 2.72 86:1 2.52 
 86:1 2.52 81:12 2.35 
 87:12 1.86 82:5 6.31 
ITL 95:3 4.34 95:3 4.23 
 92:4 15.99*** 95:11 21.79*** 
 96:12 2.85 92:4 15.26* 
JYN 81:2 10.39** 80:12 17.51*** 
 82:3 3.50 98:8 9.52 
 93:7 4.25 98:4 7.63 
NLG 81:12 2.39 98:7 3.04 
 83:2 1.87 98:2 2.22 
 93:2 1.59 97:5 2.35 
UKP 81:2 6.42 81:2 11.48* 
 82:2 5.84 81:9 11.10 
 95:12 4.83 96:12 6.59 
USD 85:2 10.55** 85:2 8.78 
 87:12 8.02 87:4 13.03* 
 89:5 4.62 84:3 4.04 
Sequential F-Statistics *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively, 
critical values from Bai/Perron (1998, tableII) 
 
tittitiiittiti eisiisi ,21,
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In general we can say that the nominal return differentials seem to be rather stable over 
time. In particular this applies to the differential with respect to the Belgian Franc, Canadian Dollar, 
DM, French Franc and the Dutch Guilder. For the Italian Lira we have one or even two breaks in 
the first half of the nineties. If we estimate the mean for the period 1980-91, 1992-1995 and 1996-
98 we obtain values of 5.74, -6.51 and 9.65, respectively. Thus, we have a nominal return 
differential in favor of the Swiss Franc for the periods of the European currency crises and the two 
following years. This mainly reflects the fact that the Lira did not depreciate as much as expected in 
this period. Interestingly the years before the introduction of the Euro witness a sharply increasing 
nominal return differential in favor  of the Lira, which  probably reflects a strong degree of 
uncertainty with respect to the participation of the Lira in the Euro zone. The return differential to 
the Yen and the Pound are very high at the beginning of the eighties (28 percent) and revert then to 
a level of 1.7 and 2.7 percent, respectively. For the US Dollar we have evidence for breaks in 1985 
and 1987. The mean return differential is 17.4 (1980-84), -20.4 (1985-87) and 1.83 (1988-98). In 
the first subperiod high US interest rates coupled with a persistently appreciating Dollar are clearly 
the reason for dramatic nominal return differential in favor of the Dollar. In the second subperiod 
this pattern is reversed: The Dollar depreciated much more strongly than reflected by the interest 
rate differential. After these turbulent episodes the nominal return differential came back to a 
“normal” level slightly below 2 percent. In general we can, however, say that with the exception of 
the two relatively short lived episodes ( Lira from 1992-95 and the US Dollar from 1985-87 ) there 
is clear evidence for a persistently lower nominal return on short term Swiss Franc assets. 
 Now let us consider the results obtained for the hypothesis of the equality of the 
unconditional means of the change in the log exchange rate and the interest rate differential in a 
VAR(1) framework. Table 4 contains the likelihood ratio statistics for the corresponding cross 
equation restriction, which follows a chi square distribution with one degree of freedom under the 
null of equality of means. 
 
Table4:  Likelihod Ratio Test of the Equality of the Mean of the log Exchange Rate 
Change and the Interest Rate Differential in a VAR(1) Model, 
Swiss Franc vis-à-vis 9 Currencies, Monthly Data 1980-98, 
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Currency LR-Test 
BEF 3.968** 
CAD 6.008** 
DEM 5.746** 
FFR 2.944* 
ITL 3.748* 
JAP 5.892** 
NLG 4.806** 
UKP 5.718** 
USD 6.020** 
  
 
*, ** and *** indicates significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively 
 
In seven out of nine cases the cross equations restriction implied by the equality of the 
unconditional mean of the log exchange rate change and the interest rate differential can be rejected 
at the 5% significance level. For the French Franc and the Italian Lira the restriction is rejected at 
the 10% significance level. Therefore the results of our VAR framework strengthen the evidence 
provided by the AR(1) model for the return differentials. Indeed the more powerful bivariate test 
allows to reject the long run validity of UIP for individual currencies and not only for all currencies 
jointly as in the univariate framework. 
 
We should stress that the violation of the long run validity holds only for the Swiss Franc 
according to our tests. The test of the joint hypothesis test in the univariate model for the return 
differential for any other currency, which is not reported in detail, cannot be rejected at any 
reasonable significance level. The same applies to the VAR cross equations restriction test for any 
pair of currencies excluding the Swiss Franc. 
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 Now let us turn to the results concerning the UIP in the short run (forward premium 
puzzle) obtained with our data. In order to contrast these result with the long run findings reported 
above we run the simple test regression for all 45 possible currency pairs of our sample. The results 
are reported in table 5.  
Table 5:  Test Results for UIP (Unbiasdness of the Forward Premium), 
Monthly Data 1980-98,    10 Currencies 
 
 
 
OLS estimates of β, standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
 CAD 
 
DEM FFR ITL JYN NLG UKP USD SFR 
BEF -1.48 
(1.01) 
 0.53 
(0.19) 
 0.91 
(0.25) 
-0.28 
(0.38) 
-0.30 
(0.76) 
 0.46 
(0.19) 
-1.11 
(0.56) 
-0.91 
(0.80) 
 0.60 
(0.37) 
CAD  -1.31 
(0.91) 
-0.43 
(079) 
 0.35 
(0.67) 
-3.55 
(1.10) 
-1.94 
(0.96) 
-4.65 
(1.08) 
-1.70 
(0.55) 
-2.23 
(0.91) 
DEM    1.12 
(0.14) 
 0.23 
(0.29) 
-1.74 
(1.10) 
-1.25 
(0.30) 
-1.10 
(0.75) 
-0.95 
(0.81) 
-1.39 
(0.79) 
FFR     0.01 
(0.49) 
 0.45 
(0.62) 
 1.14 
(0.15) 
-0.68 
(0.46) 
-0.14 
(0.66) 
 0.88 
(0.27) 
ITL      0.23 
(0.63) 
 0.26 
(0.30) 
-0.54 
(0.45) 
 0.51 
(0.63) 
 0.25 
(0.35) 
JYN      -2.14 
(1.26) 
-4.59 
(1.54) 
-2.60 
(0.97) 
-3.49 
(1.00) 
NLG       -1.42 
(0.85) 
-1.62 
(0.84) 
-1.49 
(0.77) 
UKP        -2.64 
(0.93) 
-1.96 
(0.84) 
USD         -1.68 
(0.77) 
 
 The pattern of the short run violations of UIP is clearly different from that found 
above for the long run: For the exchange rate of the Swiss Franc against the Belgian Franc, the 
French Franc and the Italian Lira there is no short run UIP failure. The slope coefficient estimate is 
positive and not statistically (at the 5 percent level) different from one. For the DM and the Dutch 
Guilder the respective coefficient estimate is negative but not statistically different from zero. The 
puzzle clearly shows up with the Canadian Dollar, the Yen, the Pound and the Dollar. The 
hypothesis that the slope coefficient for these currencies and the DM as well as Guilder are the same 
tttt uiis +−+=∆ −− )( * 11βα
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cannot be rejected at any reasonable significance level: The Wald Statistic is 0.636 with a marginal 
significance level of 0.986.  
 In general UIP works better between the continental European currencies than for the 
other currencies. There are several attempts to explain the short run failure of UIP (forward 
premium puzzle) which will not be discussed here further. For our purpose it is only important to 
stress that  the Swiss Franc is by no means special with respect to the short run failure of UIP. It is 
in the long run failure of UIP, where the Swiss Franc is unique.  
 
 Next let us consider the results of the regressions of return differentials on lagged 
variables representing world-wide aggregate risk. For the results shown in Table 6 we cumulated  
the differentials over five month since such large risk events would have effects extending over 
several months. The results are robust to variation of the number of future periods (2 to 6 months) 
over which returns are cumulated. Of course, the cumulation of returns leads to autocorrelation 
which is accounted for by using the Newey-West autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity consistent 
coefficient covariance estimate. Moreover, it should be mentioned that the short run variation of the 
return differentials is dominated by exchange rate component which has a variance many times 
larger that that of the interest rate differential.  
 
 Table 6 shows a very clear pattern : The economic factors are hardly significant, but 
the geo-political dummy variables (with the exception of the Kuwait dummy) all have a negative 
and statistically and economically highly significant effect on future excess returns. Therefore, the 
“normal” up and downs of the world economy reflected by the economic factors have hardly a 
significant influence on the Swiss franc exchange rate and the return differentials. However, large 
and unexpected geo-political events lead to a very strong appreciation of the Swiss franc (an 
decrease in s) driving down the return differential. These findings are in line with our suggested 
peso problem interpretation of long run negative excess return of Swiss franc fixed income assets.  
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Table 6: Results of a Factor Model for Swiss Franc Money Market Excess Returns 
1985-1998 
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OLS Estimates of the slope coefficients li,β  with t values in parentheses, which are based on 
heteroskedasticity  and autocorrelation corrected covariance estimate (Newey- West with truncation 
lag 4). Excess returns are annualized and in percent. 
 
1, −tlz  BEF CAD DEM FFR ITL JAP NLG UKP USD 
%IPIC 
%POIL 
%MSCIW 
%GSCIW 
%CGBIW 
Chernenko 
Tschernobyl 
Berlin wall 
Kuwait 
 
0.0028 
(0.07) 
0.0084 
(1.08) 
-0.0079 
(-0.82) 
0.0037 
(0.30) 
0.0408 
(1.83) 
-7.0013 
(-5.50) 
-11.162 
(-6.33) 
-2.0488 
(-1.90) 
-1.6951 
(-0-40)  
0.1094 
(0.83) 
-0.0130 
(-050) 
0.0068 
(0.26) 
0.0363 
(0.83) 
0.0878 
(1.08) 
-27.986 
(-5.12) 
-29.207 
(-4.49) 
-16.091 
(3.94) 
0.0617 
(0.004)  
-0.0109
(-030)
0.0096
(1.18)
-0.0041
-0.40)
0.0030
(0.24)
0.0356
(1.61)
-9.0943
(-6.21)
-8.6003
(-4.78)
-7.3725
(-7.30)
-0.5914
(0.13) 
0.0094
(0.28)
0.0142
(1.23)
-0.0054
(-0.38)
0.0057
(0.28)
0.0470
(1.52)
-5.5726
(-2.74)
-14.165
(-6.40)
-2.8363
(-2.45)
-6.8269
(-0.98) 
0.0793
(0.87)
-0.0088
(-0.68)
0.0162
(1.04)
0.0504
(2.09)
0.0313
(0.66)
-15.635
(-4.76)
-11.519
(-3.67)
-5.4350
(-2.75)
1.4160
(0.19) 
0.0292
(0.28)
-0.0084
(-0.46)
-0.0334
(-1.13)
-0.0296
(-1.07)
0.1670
(2.45)
-20.933
(-5.12)
-6.0211
(-1.45)
-48.073
(-17.3)
23.790
(2.29) 
-0.0102 
(-0.28) 
0.0101 
(1.30) 
-0.0039 
(-040) 
0.0015 
(0.12) 
0.0413 
(1.90) 
-7.4365 
(5.19) 
-8.4773 
(-4.90) 
-6.5614 
(-6.72) 
-1.0283 
(-1.03)  
0.2385
((2.22)
-0.0050
(-0.27)
-0.0009
(-0.04)
0.0260
(1.07)
-0.0555
(-0.84)
5.3135
(1.16)
-45.801
(-11.7)
-9.7095
(-3.80)
-0.0712
(-0.01) 
0.0802
(0.64)
-0.0026
-0.09)
0.0309
(0.15)
0.0130
(0.33)
0.0704
(0.93)
-29.042
(-5.71)
-26.037
(-4.29)
-20.313
(-5.18)
0.2966
(0.02) 
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 Finally we turn to historical evidence to determine if the return differential dates back 
longer than 30 years.  Our hypothesis is that the pricing anomaly may be due to a peso effect, 
investors may be paying an insurance premium for holding Swiss Francs because of expectations of 
a rare, discrete shift in the return distribution (for instance caused by a war).9  This suggests that 
historical data from the period before the World wars might be revealing to test the hypothesis: If 
the Swiss interest rate anomaly was a phenomenon of the post-war period only, this would support 
the peso hypothesis. We consider historical interest rate differentials between interest rates in 
Switzerland and seven major currencies countries for three periods.10  
 Table 7 presents results from systems of AR(1) equations for seven interest rate 
differentials and three periods11.  The system estimates are analogous to those for the post-Bretton 
Woods period reported in table 2 with the only difference that return differentials can be directly 
measured by the interest rate differentials given fixed exchange rates. The coefficient of interest is 
the intercept γ which represents the mean return differential after controlling for the AR(1) process 
(coefficient δ).  
 
Table 7: Historical Swiss Franc Interest Rate Differentials, 
Yearly data for Gold Standard 1880-1914; Restored Gold Standard 1923-1936;  
Bretton Woods System 1958-1969,  Results from AR(1) Models: 
 
 tittiiiitti
eiiii ,2
*
2,1
*
1, )()1( +−+−=− −−−− δδγ
OLS-Estimates, Standard Errors in Italics 
 Gold Standard Restored Gold Standard Bretton Woods 
   
 γ δ γ δ γ δ 
       
BEF -0.78 0.71 1.29 0.52 2.20 0.30 
 (0.27) (0.13) (0.61) (0.27) (0.42) (0.27) 
       
FFR -1.19 0.76 0.33 0.46 3.16 0.68 
 (0.25) (0.11) (0.55) (0.22) (1.23) (0.40) 
                                                     
9  See for instance Evans (1996) for a survey of the implications of peso problems for asset pricing.  
10  Yearly interest rate data from 1880-1992 was kindly provided by Michael Bordo.  We use the short 
term (3 Month) interest rates. 
11 The bivariate VAR test was not applied to this data set given the rather short sample sizes and the statistical 
significance of the individual AR(1) estimates.  
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DEM -0.41 0.48 2.60 0.52 1.32 0.01 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.61) (0.27) (0.27) (0.31) 
       
JAP -1.20 0.49 -0.51 0.45 2.90 0.82 
 (0.21) (0.16) (0.34) (0.23) (2.22) (0.20) 
       
NLG -0.73 0.64 0.18 0.03 1.02 0.56 
 (0.26) (0.15) (0.17) (0.24) (0.46) (0.27) 
       
UKP -0.84 0.66 1.02 0.14 3.46 0.49 
 (0.27) (0.13) (0.44) (0.21) (0.63) (0.33) 
       
USD 1.19 0.27 1.34 0.03 2.73 0.70 
 (0.21) (0.17) (0.18) (0.43) (1.25) (0.33) 
   
Note: Periods for the inter-war gold standard differ, since the suspension dates differ: Japan, Germany -1931 UK 1925-
1931, US -1933, Belgium -1935, Switzerland, Netherlands and France -1936, Source: Bordo and Schwarz (1994) 
 
 
 The first two columns of table 6 show the results for the period of the gold standard.  
The intercept is negative for almost all currencies, implying that Swiss interest rates were between 
0.4 an 1.2 percent higher than in other countries.  There is only one exception to this rule, the 
United States had even higher interest rates than Switzerland pointing to the an Emerging market 
status of the United States at the time.  All intercepts are individually (and jointly) significantly 
different from zero. 12  The next two columns of table 6 show that this situation changed after the 
first World war: Swiss interest rates are lower vis-à-vis all currencies with the exception of Japan.  
The differences are individually statistically significant vis-a-vis Belgium, Germany, the UK and 
the US and the largest differential is obtained for Germany, the country most affected by war and 
hyperinflation.  The last two columns show that under Bretton Woods Switzerland had significantly 
lower interest rates than any other major country.  All intercept terms are individually significant 
and the differentials are as large as 3.5 percent in the case of the UK pound.  They are smallest with 
                                                     
12  The limping gold standard in Belgium and France seem to have had little effect on interest rates 
given that differentials were not significantly different from those of currencies that were on a pure gold 
standard. The Wald test that the intercepts for the European currencies (BEL, FFR, DEN, NLG and UKP) are 
the same cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level.  
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respect to Germany and the Netherlands, a pattern that will prevail in the post-Bretton Woods 
period.  The Wald test of the hypothesis that all return differentials are the same is rejected with a χ-
square value of 15.76 and a marginal significance level of 0.015.   
 This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that investors are paying an insurance 
premium on Swiss Franc assets for catastrophic events. However, the magnitude of the return 
differentials during interwar period and the Bretton Woods period have be to interpreted with care 
since they probably incorporate expectations of disruptions and devaluations.13   
                                                     
13  By 1923/25 the core countries had restored the gold standard. Japan, Germany and UK abandoned 
the gold standard in 1931 at the onset of the great depression.  The United States followed suite in 1933, 
Belgium abandoned in 1935, and Switzerland, Netherlands and France held on until 1936.  Virtually all 
central banks broke the ”rules of the game” during this period by attempting to shield the domestic economy 
from foreign disturbances and offsetting attempting to sterilize changes in international reserves with changes 
in domestic credit. Thus, the exchange rate peg did not have the same credibility during the period of the 
restored gold standard as it had enjoyed during the period of the classical gold standard.  A caveat applies to 
the Bretton Woods period given the possibility of revaluations under this system.   
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 4. Conclusions 
 
This paper has presented evidence of a long run anomaly in Swiss assets returns. The 
nominal returns of Swiss assets has been significantly lower than in other major currencies after 
correcting for exchange rate changes. This has been true on average for more than 25 years 
implying unexploited arbitrage gains in shortening Swiss Francs. This long run deviation from UIP 
is different from the anomaly generally identified in the literature that refers to the short run 
anomalous response of exchange rates to changes in  the interest rate differential.   
The interest rate puzzle cannot be explained with specific national features of Switzerland 
as the Swiss banking secrecy since it is present also in the returns of Euromarket Swiss Franc 
deposits located outside Switzerland.  
We suggest that the most likely explanation for this puzzle is a peso problem: investors are 
willing to pay a premium for holding Swiss Frank assets expecting that in a severe crisis situation 
the Swiss Frank would appreciate. We find support for this hypothesis from two empirical findings: 
first, we show that the return differential is negatively affected in the short run by large unexpected 
geo-political events. Second the examination of historical data on interest rates differentials during 
the pre-war and inter-war period show that the abnormally low level of Swiss returns arises after the 
first world war only.. Before 1914 Switzerland  had higher interest rates than most other countries 
under the gold standard.   
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